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HealtH Care:
Why Jurisdiction Matters
By Kevin C. Walsh
ongress’s enactment of comprehensive 
healthcare reform legislation last year was 
the culmination of one round of an intense 
debate that continues today. The second 
round began the same day that the first round ended, 
when President Obama signed the legislation. In this 
second round, the locus of debate has shifted from 
Congress to the courts, which are processing a slew of 
lawsuits filed immediately after enactment. 
One of the most prominent is Virginia v. Sebelius. 
The lawsuit presents on its face a prominent and criti-
cally important question of federalism: Did Congress 
exceed the limits of its enumerated legislative powers 
by enacting the individual mandate, which requires 
individuals to have insurance or pay a penalty for 
failing to have it? But the lawsuit also presents a less 
recognized but equally important question of separa-
tion of powers: Is the federal judiciary authorized to 
rule on Virginia’s claim that the individual mandate is 
unconstitutional? 
Virginia seeks to vindicate the Health Care Freedom 
Act, a state statute declaring that no Virginia resi-
dent shall be required to obtain or maintain 
health insurance. To defend this state law 
from the preemptive effect of federal 
law, Virginia contends that the federal 
legislation’s 
individual mandate to obtain and maintain health insur-
ance is unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has held, 
however, that a state cannot go to federal court simply 
to seek a declaratory judgment that its state law is not 
preempted by federal law—precisely the relief sought 
in Virginia v. Sebelius. The upshot is that, in seeking to 
enforce limits on federal legislative powers, Virginia’s 
lawsuit runs afoul of limits on the federal judicial power.
The federal government did not identify this 
particular jurisdictional flaw in its filings in the district 
court, although the federal government did move to 
dismiss on other jurisdictional grounds. The district 
court denied that motion to dismiss and ruled in 
Virginia’s favor on the merits of its constitutional chal-
lenge. The jurisdictional and merits rulings are cur-
rently being reviewed on appeal.
Even if Virginia’s case is jurisdictionally defective, 
the federal courts will be able to decide the constitu-
tionality of the individual mandate in other cases. In 
fact, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth 
Circuit has paired Virginia 
v. Sebelius for back-to-
back argument 
with another 
constitutional 
challenge to 
C
the individual mandate that is not subject to the same 
jurisdictional objections as Virginia’s. One might ask, 
then, why the federal courts should bother to spend time 
on jurisdictional technicalities in Virginia’s case.
The reason is that form matters in constitutional 
adjudication. The United States does not have a system 
in which the federal courts function as a free-floating 
council of revision. Constitutional adjudication is—
and ought to remain—incidental to the resolution of a 
justiciable case or controversy. 
Alexis de Tocqueville, astute observer of American 
legal culture that he was, explained early in this nation’s 
history why it is essential to adhere strictly to case-
centered constitutional adjudication. “If the judge had 
been empowered to contest the law on the ground of 
theoretical generalities,” Tocqueville wrote, “if he were 
able to take the initiative and to censure the legisla-
tor, he would play a prominent political part; and as 
the champion or antagonist of a party, he would have 
brought the hostile passions of the nation into the 
conflict.” This peril of politicization is minimized 
by insisting on incidental adjudication of constitu-
tional issues—that is, constitutional adjudication that 
takes place only as incidental to resolution of a case 
or controversy. This feature of federal jurisdiction, 
Tocqueville recognized, ensures that “the American 
judge is brought into the political arena independently 
of his own will. He judges the law only because he is 
obliged to judge a case.” 
Virginia v. Sebelius is not a case that the federal courts 
are authorized, let alone obliged, 
to decide. Virginia has 
conceded that it can-
not sue the federal 
government as 
parens patriae, 
that is, in a 
representative capacity to protect its citizens from federal 
law. Virginia also has conceded that, in the absence of 
the Health Care Freedom Act, its constitutional claim 
against the mandate would be too abstract to constitute 
a justiciable controversy in federal court. 
Virginia argues that the Health Care Freedom Act 
makes all the difference; it transforms a dispute that 
would otherwise be abstract and non-justiciable into 
one that is concrete and ripe for resolution. But the 
conflict between state and federal law remains abstract. 
The single provision of federal law that Virginia 
asserts to be outside Congress’s constitutional authority 
imposes no obligation on Virginia itself—only on its 
residents. And the rights of no particular individual are 
asserted to be at issue in Virginia’s lawsuit. 
If Virginia can generate a justiciable controversy 
where one would not otherwise exist, by first passing a 
law and then seeking a declaratory judgment about that 
law’s validity, then so too can any other state. This juris-
dictional two-step would provide entrée to a prominent 
platform for elected state officials to seek judicial valida-
tion of their constitutional visions apart from a concrete 
controversy, which would have significant political 
consequences. The practical effect would be to elimi-
nate the insulation provided by the case-or-controversy 
requirement whenever a controversial issue mobilizes a 
state legislature to enact an anti-federal-law state law. Yet 
that is precisely when such insulation is most needed. 
There is nothing wrong with filing a lawsuit to 
enforce limits on federal legislative power. But such 
lawsuits must fit within the limited jurisdiction granted 
to the federal courts by Congress and the United States 
Constitution. Even if Virginia is correct that 
Congress has exceeded its limited authority, 
that provides no reason to invite a fed-
eral court to do the same. n
Kevin C. Walsh is an assistant professor of law whose 
scholarship explores the doctrines that define—and 
delimit—the scope of federal judicial power. This essay 
was adapted from his forthcoming publication, 
The Ghost that Slew the Mandate, 64 
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